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This  paper  describes  and  analyses  the  social  uses  of  the  notion  of
autonomy  in  the  life  courses  of young  adults  confronting  psychic
disorders.  It  is  based  on a three-year  longitudinal  study,  conducted
under  the  auspices  of doctoral  research  in sociology,  with  21 young
adults  receiving  treatment  in psychiatric  and  medico-social  insti-
tutions.  We  describe  how  the  shared  and  divergent  meanings
attributed  to autonomy  lead to issues  relating  to  young  clients’
engagement  in  the  work  to  support  them.
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r  é  s  u  m  é
Nous  proposons  dans  cet  article  de décrire  et  d’analyser  les  usages
sociaux  de la notion  d’autonomie  dans  les  parcours  de  jeunes
adultes  confrontés  à  des  troubles  psychiques.  En nous  appuyant  sur
une  enquête  longitudinale  de  trois  ans,  menée  dans  le  cadre  d’une
thèse  de  sociologie  auprès  de 21  jeunes  adultes  pris  en  charge  dans
des  institutions  psychiatriques  et  médico-sociales,  nous  décrivons
comment  derrière  des  représentations  différenciées  ou partagées
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de  l’autonomie,  émergent  des  enjeux  relatifs  à  l’engagement  des
jeunes  usagers  dans  le  travail  d’accompagnement  mené  autour
d’eux.
©  2014  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.
Tous  droits  réservés.
This article examines representations of autonomy in the discourse of young adults confronting
psychic disorders (which in some cases may  be recognized as “psychic disability”), as well as family
members and the professionals involved in their care and support. Through analysis of the discourse
of people engaged in this work in different capacities, I aim to describe and understand the social uses
of the notion of autonomy in such situations. I am not trying to deﬁne autonomy in any real sense,
or to evaluate people according to a pre-deﬁned norm of what an autonomous individual might be; I
simply wonder what the people involved in the support relationship make of the notion. This question
emerged over the course of my  doctoral research with young adults supported by programmes devoted
to mental health and psychic disability who shared a common issue: a permanent tension between
the adult norm of independence and the reality of relationships of support and dependency.
The transitional process into adulthood is commonly deﬁned by the steps of moving out of the
family home and entering employment. These steps are rarely simultaneous (Galland, 1996). For F.
de Singly, “young people are in social and psychological conditions that allow them to achieve a
certain independence, but without disposing of sufﬁcient resources, especially economic, to be truly
independent from their parents” (de Singly, 2000, p. 12). This literature distinguishes between ﬁnancial
independence, characterized by professional activity (among other things), and autonomy, deﬁned as
a process of self-construction. Along these lines, V. Cicchelli uses the concept of autonomisation to
describe the permanent tension between autonomy and dependency in the passage to adulthood.
In relations with their parents, then, young people oscillate between child and adult status, and are
“simultaneously dependent and independent” (Cicchelli, 2001, p. 144). In this case, autonomy, the
“incessant movement between relationship forms and others” (Ennuyer, 2002, p. 289), is not so much
an individual characteristic as it is a relation of interdependency between parents and children or
between professionals and clients.
In a situation of mental illness, this autonomising process is often thought to be disrupted by both
the disorders themselves and the difﬁculty young people have in breaking away from parental sup-
port (Bungener, 2001). Although a lack of autonomy in the passage into adulthood is a commonly
acknowledged challenge, our study of young adults supported by mental health and psychic disabil-
ity programmes provides a novel standpoint for identifying the various representations guiding this
transition. It emerges that autonomy is a word serving largely as a screen: despite the fact everyone
seems to agree on using the term (families, all sorts of professional, young people), one might wonder
just how far this agreement goes, and if the word covers the same representations and practices for all.
Consulting 126 application ﬁles for disability recognition1 allowed me  to take account of the great
diversity of applicants’ trajectories. The sample for semi-structured interviews was selected to rep-
resent the diversity of forms of institutional support offered to young people said to be suffering
from mental disorders: medico-social services (two ITEP, two ESAT2), child, adolescent, and adult
psychiatric sectors (two day clinics and a hospital), a drug addiction care centre, and three non-proﬁt
networks (of professionals, families, and clients). I moreover chose to observe mental health situations
both within the psychiatric sector (where they are commonly described in the terms of psychic disor-
ders and mental health) and inside the medico-social ﬁeld (supporting issues particular to disability),
1 The ﬁles had been previously selected by a doctor-coordinator of the Midi-Pyrénées COTOREP (formerly the MDPH of the
Haute-Garonne); this public organization is charged with evaluating and deciding on work abilities, requests handicapped
worker status, disability ratings, and beneﬁts. They were selected from 7388 requests ﬁled over a six-month period in 2004–5.
I  examined requests concerning psychological and behavioural problems and those coming from people aged 18 to 24.
2 ITEP: Instituts Thérapeutiques, Éducatifs et Pédagogiques (facilities for the therapy, education, and life-skill training of children
and  adolescents); ESAT: Établissement et Service d’Aide par le Travail (facility providing support and productive activities for adults
with  lowered abilities to work).
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fully recognizant of the frequent back-and-forth between the two sectors. Lastly, I was especially
attentive to the moments of transition from the youth system to the adult system.3 Twenty-one young
adults from 17 to 24 years old ultimately agreed to participate in the study, twelve of whom with ofﬁ-
cial disability recognition. I sought to expand interviews to people around each of them (parents and
professionals) and to observe them in ESAT and day clinics, as appropriate.
After a quick tour of the sociological conceptions of autonomy, I will analyse how young adults,
parents and professional variously use the notion. I will then present the professional ideal of auton-
omy  support and its limitations. I will conclude by taking account of the reactions of young adults
themselves to these normative forms of support.
1. Support under the sign of autonomy
Autonomy is a widely discussed and debated notion in various spheres of the human and social
sciences, especially in sociology (Ehrenberg, 2010), political science (Eyraud, 2006), and philosophy
(Jouan and Laugier, 2009). There are several competing conceptions, each with its own deﬁnition
and socio-political issues that may  sometimes even be contradictory. On one hand, some defend an
individual’s right to free will and freedom from external constraints, frequently deﬁned by institu-
tionalized and alienating forms and sometimes by the State. These conceptions accept an “idealized”
vision of autonomy that holds that the individual has emancipatory and reﬂexive capabilities to con-
front all forms of dependency. To the reverse, other authors have picked up on the negative side of
autonomy, perceived as a normative injunction imposed on the individual and leading to the weak-
ening of the frames structuring collective and individual trajectories. R. Castel thus speaks of negative
individualism for “lack of frameworks” (Castel, 2003, p. 452) and Marc Bessin (2009) describes the
new injunction to “biographical activation” to which the most helpless youth are particularly subject.
The modern individual would possess a greater propensity to express his or her own identity as collec-
tive constraints disintegrate. But this new freedom does not have the same consequences in all social
groups, and it could bring about situations of insecurity and risk for a fringe of the population that lives
in the interstices of economic and cultural spaces. Over a backdrop of de-institutionalization, Franc¸ ois
Dubet makes a connection between autonomy and responsibility, which creates new demands of
the individual. “The obligation to be free, to be master and sovereign of oneself, presents a darker
side, because if everyone is free and put in the conditions to manifest this freedom, everyone becomes
responsible for whatever happens to them” (Dubet, 2002, p. 360). By weakening collective rules, auton-
omy  becomes an individual and normative requirement in relations with others and institutions, as
Alain Ehrenberg points out: “Today autonomy must be addressed as a question of change in the ‘social
spirit’ of institutions” (Ehrenberg, 2009, pp. 222–223).
This “spirit” of autonomy is manifested in professional practice by an individualized support that
places the subjectivity of the person receiving that support at the heart of their care. The purpose of
the action is no longer to heal, but to support (Ehrenberg, 2004; Ion, 2005), or even “co-produce” a
new social connection with the client (Foucart, 2005).
The individualization of support also takes place in a general context of reduced material and
human means (Sicot, 2006). Care has gone from a focus on compensation to assure people’s integration
in a ﬂourishing economic market to programmes to support individuals perceived as challenged by
aiming to keep them active socially (and economically, if possible) in what has become an uncertain
socio-economic context. This tension between activation and protection highlights particular issues
related to the principal of social participation, which has become central (Fougeyrollas, Cloutier,
Bergeron, Cote, & Saint-Michel, 1998). Focusing on the individual cannot be reduced to a single
dimension, however, because the individual is so complex and “plural” (Bresson, 2006). Moreover,
autonomy, as the central principle of public intervention, was  constructed differently in the policy
spheres of youth and disability, according to their particular internal tensions. Instead of being in a
simple opposition between liberal and protectionist models, these conceptions of autonomy are on a
3 Although this institutional transition is planned for age 20 in medico-social programs, it is set at 18 in the psychiatric sector.
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continuum between a conception of the individual’s capacities and the issues of social participation
and citizenship (Parron, 2011).
The notion of autonomy includes a veritable chorus of meanings, making it screen upon which many
actors can seemingly agree while diverging in practice. The stakes here are far from being exclusively
individual, but to the contrary are eminently collective and touch on the deﬁnition of the place of
individuals in public institutions (such as health and medico-social programmes and facilities) as well
as in private settings like the family. This is what I will now describe in detail, based on the ﬁeld study.
2. Autonomy, a screen-word
Analysis of the discourses collected during the ﬁeld study conﬁrms the omnipresence of the theme
of autonomy among professionals, young people, and the people close to them. But behind this uni-
formity, it quickly became evident that the term’s uses are not only diverse, they may  sometimes
even be antagonistic. Although young people mostly emphasize the dimension of choice to deﬁne
their own autonomy, parents more often stress an inability to become autonomous, and professionals
tend to insist on deﬁning their work as a resource favouring autonomy. And indeed, according to R.
Le Coadic (2006) there are three constitutive elements of autonomy: choices, abilities, and resources.
My analysis shows that these differences are strongly connected to professional and family status.
2.1. Autonomy in contexts
For young adults, autonomy assumes a normative dimension: to be autonomous is to have a normal
life, to know how to do things “like everyone else”, to use an expression frequently heard in interviews.
Their abilities are on probation, as is their responsibility. They are supposed to prove their autonomy
in various domains. So, it is that Annabelle4 distinguishes autonomy from independence and insists
on the question of choices:
I’m not independent, I can’t manage on my  own  ﬁnancially, but since it’s. . . it’s dumb to say but
I’m going to deﬁne it this way: I’m the one who decides everything I do, the kind of care I get,
or my  bank, I’m the one who chooses everything, like, since my parents stopped being involved
in my  choices. But even with supplementary insurance or anything! Yes, I think of myself as
autonomous. (Annabelle, university student).
Jean-Marc,5 a 23-year-old basic employee with Recognition of the Quality of Handicapped Worker
(Reconnaissance de la Qualité de Travailleur Handicapé;  RQTH) status, insists on his intention to be “max-
imally autonomous”, describing the areas where he is while admitting that he delegates some tasks,
like managing his paperwork, to his mother. In nearly every interview with young adults, autonomy
is thus contextualized and connected to distinct domains of life. One senses that it is very important
for them to foreground their autonomy, including material and ﬁnancial dependency contexts. Help
from family relativizes autonomy without negating it, as if a lack of autonomy was  a reﬂection of an
intolerable or excessively degrading situation, to the opposite of dependency.
2.2. “Bad autonomy”
On the family side, autonomy is mostly mobilised by default to refer to a lack of ability to act. Once
again, this impairment is connected to particular domains, such as management of daily life, health,
or professional and social life. While young people’s discourse focuses on full autonomy, their parents
speak more of the risk of broken social connections and exclusion from society.
Behind this opposition, which could be read as more or less positive ways of evaluating the sit-
uation (glass half empty or half full), hide relational issues between young adults and their parents
4 She was diagnosed as bipolar in the adult psychiatric sector, but she does not recognize herself in this pathology. At the
time of the interview, she was 24, attending university, and living in housing paid for by her parents.
5 Considered “psychotic” by the specialized counselor questioned about his situation.
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that relate rather directly to the power relations between generations described by Pierre Bourdieu
(1992). Indeed, psychic disorders upset the usual framework and steps for passage into adulthood, as
further symbolized by the oddity of the threshold of age 20 separating childhood from adulthood in
the ﬁeld of handicap. Many parents feel that the timing of their child’s advancement toward auton-
omy, which should parallel their transition into adulthood, should be shifted, even against the wishes
of the concerned young person. Mrs  Renard, a retired basic employee whose son was  diagnosed as
schizophrenic, explains her say of seeing things:
No, that’s just it, the mentally ill should not get autonomy at age 18, that would be a disaster,
because he is not at all stabilized, because he isn’t able to take care of himself at all (. . .). We
know that getting autonomy too early is destined to failure because the stabilization of a mental
illness is 50/50. The ﬁrst 50 should be the care in priority, the medical care and taking medication
and that, that takes time. (. . .)  The person at the beginning is in denial. (Mrs Renard, retired).
Related to this oft-mobilised idea of denial of illness is the idea that young people can be “too
autonomous”, which is to say that they do not acknowledge their need for support. Autonomy in
this case is understood as a decision-making capacity, which could be manifested in dangerous ways
outside of social norms without oversight by mental health professionals. Autonomy is not understood
as institutional independence, but to the contrary is projected onto relations of support, whether in
the family or the professional care setting. This notion of “supported autonomy” is explicit and central
in the professionals’ discourse.
2.3. “Supported” autonomy
The ﬁeld of social work is complex and varied, from the range of professions involved, the pro-
grammes it develops, and the publics it serves. As one might expect, this professional landscape is run
through with fragmented frames of reference (Autès, 2004). Professionals, according to their activ-
ity sector, profession, facility’s policies, and theoretical references from their training, are bound to
develop different conceptions of autonomy. Using a comparative study on patients’ roles in psycho-
analysis and psychopharmacology, Dodier and Sandra (2006) oppose “delegated autonomy”, founded
on psychiatrists’ “pedagogical” attitude aiming “to construct actors more competent in the manage-
ment of their symptoms”, and “reﬂexive autonomy”, which in a psychoanalytic mode asks the patient
to be “the author of a certain number of discoveries about [his or her] own  history” (2006, p. 4).
Although these conceptions are focused on different elements, they nonetheless share the idea that
the professional’s work is a resource that favours autonomy.
The professionals I met6 thus did not depict support and autonomy as being antithetical; to the
contrary, in the case of their patients, unsupported autonomy is thought to be “false” or “bad” in that
it leads to various forms of decline or social marginalisation. True autonomy should occur through
forms of support from which the patient only withdraws very gradually.
Well yes, those are supported autonomies, but without. . . how to put it? It’s one of the symptoms
of their disorder; it’s this impossibility to initiate anything. After, when it’s like that, structured,
organized from the outside, in this organization, they can sometimes really, really ﬁnd their
way, I would say that it’s all a matter of dosage. (Mrs M.,  psychologist at ESAT)
In this quote, the psychologist justiﬁes support work by an initiative deﬁcit that is “one of the
symptoms of their disorder”. She says that the facility provides a structure that allows this deﬁcit to
be overcome. She speciﬁes, however, that “it’s all a matter of dosage”, meaning that the professional’s
work includes a search for balance between autonomy and support. This search takes the form of a
great many metaphorical formulations in interviews (“crutches”, “stake”) to illustrate the oxymoron
of “supported autonomy”.
6 I met  a great variety of mental health professionals over the course of ﬁeldwork, representing psychoanalytic obedience,
behavioral psychology, and other very different frames of reference.
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Although fear of crumbling social relations and marginality is shared by parents and profession-
als alike, the latter also indicate a risk of “institutionalization” that justiﬁes an intermediary attitude
between too much intervention and too much permissiveness, or, to use an economic metaphor,
between protectionism and liberalism. This vision is based on an impairment-focused deﬁnition of
the supported person’s capacities for action and initiative that legitimates professionals having a
dominating and restrictive relationship over their patients or clients.
Behind the apparent convergence of discourses of autonomy, young adults, their parents, and pro-
fessionals differ over the content of the term and the practices that come with it. The question of
choice is present in the young adults’ discourse, while parents and professionals insist more on the
negative aspects of autonomy, which the former relate to a risk of social marginalisation and the latter
to a tension between social marginalisation and institutionalisation. These conceptions of good and
bad autonomy allow us to better understand the issues in play in professional support work, which I
will now analyse in greater depth.
3. Autonomy in dependency
Analyses of patient/health professional relations have drawn attention to the gradual develop-
ment of the notion of health service co-production (Strauss, 1992). In the ﬁeld of psychic disorders,
the idea of client “support” (accompagnement)  is establishing itself, at least in ofﬁcial discourse, over
the old term “care” (prise en charge). As important as these transformations may  be, they have not
affected power relations between professionals and laymen, or even dissipated the ﬁgures of “good”
and “bad” patients (who for that matter have recently become “clients”, usagers) (Strauss, 1992).
Indeed, Loriol, Boussard, and Caroly, 2010 deﬁne a client as “a co-producer upon which professionals
try to impose their legitimacy. [The latter] thus creates an implicit distinction between the “good”
client (who reinforces the professional vision of the occupation, its mission, and work well done) and
the “bad” (who disrupts the implementation of the professional ideal with his speech or behaviour)”
(Loriol et al., 2010, p. 1). Although any generalization on the subject is delicate given the diversity of
approaches and professional frames of reference in the ﬁeld of psychological difﬁculties, the repre-
sentations professionals make of their support work are caught in a pair of tensions: one between
a person’s heteronomy and autonomy, and another between institutional dependency and indepen-
dence. This results in four ideal-typical situations (Fig. 1). Two of them allow young clients to continue
to participate in society: the situation of young clients who  manage their support relationships and
their institutional enrolments (normalisation), and the situation of young clients involved in a process
of institutional normalization guaranteeing supported work toward autonomy (supported autonomi-
sation). Conversely, the other two are thought to bear a signiﬁcant risk of social exclusion: the situation
of young adults on the fringe of mental health services (bad autonomy) and that of dependent young
clients who are not very engaged in the support programme (dependency).
These simple conceptions of autonomy allow the drafting of a dominant professional ideology that
values “supported autonomy” and obliges young people to subscribe to relationships of dependency,
conceived as resources to be managed. In concrete situations, discourses are also structured by con-
textual elements and social or gendered determinants, as shown in the four professional accounts that
follow.
3.1. The path of supported autonomisation
The specialized counsellor at an ITEP who  works with Jean-Marc (age 23) describes his story as a
“real success”. He says that Jean-Marc was psychotic but “he has developed very well”. The counsel-
lor elaborates the young man’s difﬁculties when he ﬁrst arrived at the facility (elocution problems,
difﬁculties integrating himself into groups). The professional also mentioned a “familial problematic”
with a mother receiving the Handicapped Adult Beneﬁt (allocation adulte handicapée; AAH). Jean-
Marc’s “success” is materialised in the fact he earned two  degrees7 while under ITEP support, and by
7 A CAP and a BEP, secondary-level vocational degrees.
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Fig. 1. Professional conceptions of autonomy.
his participation in the facility’s activities. Upon leaving the facility with the RQTH, he found a job and
moved out of his parents’ house. In the counsellor’s discourse, the process of becoming autonomous
that was initiated in and by the facility allowed Jean-Marc to integrate himself professionally and to
break with a harmful family situation. The transition from one dependency (on the family) to another
(the institution) is described here as an autonomisation process that eventually achieves a form of
independence by entry into employment.
3.2. Normalisation
Access to independence is thus not perceived as a decisive criterion for successful support. In some
cases, staying in psychiatric programmes is seen as a form of autonomisation relative to various prior
forms of dependency (on family, drugs or alcohol, ﬁnancial support. . .).  In other cases, to the contrary,
autonomisation is thought to be found in a transition from an institutional dependency to a domestic
dependency; this is the case for Natalia, age 20, described by a manager and a coordinating psychiatrist
at a day clinic for children and youth as experiencing a “psychosis of adolescence”. Despite her hav-
ing received long-term care in the youth psychiatric sector, they agree that Natalia’s situation is not
appropriate for a ofﬁcial recognition of disability, and envisage that she get in a romantic relationship
to compensate for her problems instead. The psychiatrist puts it this way:
“I think that she has the possibility of getting by, but she’s someone who still has signiﬁcant
fragility. So it’s the same thing, she’s got to chance upon a boy who  gets attached to her. I can
really see her at the head of a large family”. The manager speaks along the same lines: “I think
that if she meets her Prince Charming and he understands her, she’ll be able to have a life”.
Interpreting such a position is delicate work. On one hand, the professionals’ statements can be
read as bids on Natalia’s possible autonomisation, outside mental health programmes. On the other
hand, this autonomy is thought to depend on a domestic partner, implying a domestic dependency
that they would certainly not imagine in the same way  for a man. If this interpretation is ambivalent,
it is because it is easier to consider women’s domestic dependency as normal than it is for men, with
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shades of Durkheim’s “conjugal regulation”, where the woman is simultaneously dominated (so in a
way dependent) but in her place (Durkheim, 2006). The transition from one dependency to the other
could thus be seen as a process of normalisation.
3.3. Bad autonomy and bad dependency
For many professionals, exit from all support relationships may  be judged problematic and, once
again, lead to an assessment of “bad autonomy”. This is how a specialised ITEP counsellor describes
the story of Nathan, age 20, who had been admitted in late adolescence. Leaving the facility with
neither a job nor an orientation to another programme, he applied for the AAH and returned home
to live with his mother, also unemployed, who the counsellor described as “psychotic herself”. The
professional sketches Nathan’s situation in terms of “social closure”, with behaviours perceived as
being risky or deviant: “It’s gone into psychotic closure, apart from the living”. The absence of support
is seen as an impediment to the autonomisation process because his new environment is judged to
be unsupportive, even unhealthy.
Some professionals vaunt patients’ enrolment in support relationships as a validation of the
autonomisation process, but their accounts also refer to young people’s duty to engage and get involved
in facility plans or programmes so that support does not turn into a bad dependency. The situation
of 24-year-old Juliette, as presented by a nurse coordinator in a day clinic, illustrates how too much
institutional dependency can be a problem inside the facility.
Juliette, unemployed, struggles to ﬁnd her place in an adult day clinic. She says she is sick and stays
in a room apart from the others. Professionals signal the difﬁculty she has integrating herself in her
new facility. Her nurse coordinator conﬁdes his doubts about the young woman’s ability to subscribe
to the day clinic’s programme:
“You know, I don’t know if she’ll be able to stay”. He believes her illness is not sufﬁciently
stabilised for treatment in a day clinic. Each programme selects clients according to criteria
that are more or less objectiﬁed as symptoms. In Juliette’s case, her refusal to subscribe to the
facility’s programme and the acute manifestations of her mental illness put her integration into
doubt. Her situation illustrates the injunction for clients to participate actively in the offered
activities.
If health and social service professionals generally agree on the notion of supported autonomy,
these few examples illustrate both the variety of positions to be found when one gets into the details
of particular situations and the ambiguities of the intersection of autonomy and dependency, whose
relative worth is evaluated by a great many criteria, including some characteristics particular to the
supported person (age, sex, social background) and others particular to the professionals (professional
position, theoretical orientation, type of organization). While the four ideal-typical situations detailed
earlier may  appear to be quite distinct from each other, many cases are actually found at the inter-
sections, shifting back-and forth according to the professionals, depending on how relations with the
supported person develop. In fact, the supported person also has ways of reacting to these judgements,
and this interactive dynamic allows judgements and representations to become established.
4. Young people’s point of view: between subscribing and resistance
This last section offers an analysis of the accounts of the young accompanied adults themselves,
who are asked to be both autonomous and engaged in support relationships all at once. Here again,
the postures are diverse and several forms of subscription and resistance can be distinguished.
4.1. Reﬂexivity and involvement
Annabelle, 24 years old, is in her third year of university studying the social sciences and is engaged
in a therapeutic relationship with a psychoanalyst-psychiatrist during the ﬁrst phase of ﬁeldwork.
A year later, during the study’s second phase, she was  still a third-year student and was  thinking
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of changing therapists. She describes her care history, giving the decision-making process a central
position:
I was thinking about how to ﬁnd a way  [to stop both my therapy and my marijuana consumption].
Stopping the therapy itself doesn’t automatically mean no longer getting follow-up care, because
ultimately that’s what follow-up is for. I was  looking for a way  to somehow keep a medical
crutch, psychiatric care. I kinda think that I was  afraid of it, actually, the idea of ﬁnding myself
without a shrink after having gone through a very difﬁcult year, knowing that with stopping
the treatment, after, relapses can still happen – I know that really well because I’ve already gone
through it. I turned to cognitive-behavioral therapy – CBT – for that, so I went looking for another
psychiatrist who could help me  just to stop marijuana, only that. I met  two, and I chose one who
I’ve been working with for more than six months now, yeah, eight months, something like that,
and I’m really happy, I’ve made progress. (Annabelle, student).
She demonstrates reﬂexivity in her discourse. This quote exempliﬁes an account focused on choice
and individual initiative. The “I” is omnipresent, as much in decision-making (“I went looking”, “I chose
one”) as in evaluating the situation (“I’m really happy”, “I’ve made progress”).
Sébastien,8 also 24, has worked in an ESAT (facilities that provide work opportunities to the dis-
abled) since he left a day hospital at age 20. He spoke about the residential facility:
“[They teach us]  to make ourselves autonomous; we have a budget and we’re the ones who
should do the shopping, we’re the ones who should do the cooking, so, I mean, it’s in a house
and then (he hesitates), it’s up to us to manage our meals, all that”. (Sébastien, 24, worker in an
ESAT).
In his account, he acknowledges the facility’s capacity to favour his autonomy. Along these lines,
he mentions his involvement in this autonomisation process.
These two forms of subscription, centred on the ability of young people to become subjects by
subscribing to the facility’s group programme or the support programme, have already been developed
by Isabelle Coutant in her study of a psychiatric crisis unit for adolescents. She notes that care teams
implement a “pedagogy of reﬂexivity” aiming to encourage their clients do the work on themselves
that is necessary for them to become engaged in the institutional programme (Coutant, 2012). By
placing themselves at the heart of the decision-making process and by emphasizing professionals’
action, young programme participants promote their agreement with the support relationship. But
reading young adults’ accounts allows us to catch a glimpse of forms of resistance to this paradoxical
injunction, as much in the interpretation of their situation as in the choice of areas for support.
4.2. Resistance
Not all problems or situations are characterised in the same way by all the concerned actors. Retur-
ning to Jean-Marc’s situation, his account differs from that of his ITEP counsellor. Their conceptions of
success, among other things, are not the same. In Jean-Marc’s telling of the story, he is removed from all
decision-making on the various orientations he might take. This concerns his scholastic career (“They
decided to make me  stop school and to put me  in specialized facilities”), then with recognition of his
handicapped status (“They made me  do it [get recognized handicapped status];  they make everyone do
it”), and lastly his entry into employment (“I was  offered a job here”). On the subject of his support
by ITEP, he distinguishes himself from other clients, who he calls “mentally disabled” and considers
“heavier cases” than he. He also indicates the challenges of his present situation, complaining of his
working conditions and his inability to look for another job: “I want to do it, but I don’t”.
Young people may  thus express forms of resistance in their accounts and in confrontations with
professionals’ deﬁnition of “good” support. Other elements, like scholastic reorientation or past insti-
tutionalisation, give meaning to the whole course of experience and create a relationship with support
that is quite different from that of professionals.
8 The ESAT psychologist designated him as “psychotic”.
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At the start of adulthood, parents’ engagements in support work can also be subject to negotiation.
New spaces of autonomy or new forms of dependency may  become established. Extra-familial pro-
grammes are sometimes considered to compensate for some kind of dependency in particular areas.
The following quote presents a negotiation between an unemployed mother and her son over bud-
getary management. Antoine, age 17, is no longer in school and has frequent stays at a specialised
hospital.9 His mother would like to put a protective measure in place when her son reaches the age
of majority, insisting on the fact that his illness prevents him from being able to manage a budget. He
wants to demonstrate the contrary and prove he is able to be autonomous in money management.
Mrs  P.: When you turn 18, maybe we should think about a guardian to manage your money.
Because, for example, in terms of your telephone, it got a little out of control.
Antoine: It won’t happen again.
Mrs  P.: “It won’t happen again”, now really. They are impulses, so I can’t predict that there will
or won’t be another time. But I mean to say that [if] you have three or four hundred euros in
your bank account, I’m sure that two hundred, three hundred euros, they are gone in two  weeks.
And after that you have to live, the day when you lead your own life, you’re going to have to pay
the little bills, pay your rent, that’s why, often, things are managed so that you can have some
money, a little spending money, but at least the rent is paid, the bills are paid.
Antoine: To the contrary, I prefer to get by on my  own  and (. . .)  get by on my own  to prove I can
do it.
Resistance to the injunction to reﬂexivity may  thus take quite varied forms, from the passive (by
letting oneself be directed in a way that may  go unnoticed by some of the concerned professionals) to
more explicit oppositions, as in Antoine’s case. Generally speaking, this resistance is based on what are
often strongly divergent readings of the situation by the concerned young people, their families, and
the mobilised professionals. One of the purposes of support is to make these readings converge toward
that of the professionals, which meets with variable success. Here again, the notion of autonomy may
be either a starting point, allowing dialogue to start on a minimally consensual basis, or, sometimes,
a hollow shell that cannot prevent signiﬁcant and potentially long-lasting misunderstandings from
developing.
5. Conclusion
By keeping help from the family and signing up for various support programmes, the autonomi-
sation process of young people experiencing psychic disorders does not lend itself to a simple
characterisation along an axis between a situation of dependency and a state of independence. To
the contrary, maintaining young people’s social participation becomes the central issue in face of the
risk of crumbling social ties.
A person’s relationship to support programmes, deﬁned according to his or her engagement in a
plan that is both individual (life plan) and collective (involvement in the institutional programme),
determines how he or she will be situated on the boundary between clients the professional ideal con-
siders “engaged” (an involved young dependent person) and those designated as “excluded” (a young
person who remains on the fringe of the institutional programme). Consequently, the autonomisation
process is rarely deﬁned by departure from support programmes, but rather by clients’ engagement
in personal and institutional plans. Although these programmes are commonly perceived as resources
favouring autonomy, young clients may  consider them to be limiting, depending on how engaged they
are in the collective plan.
C. Van de Velde deﬁned the search for autonomy in early adulthood as “a long process that tends
to the unﬁnished” (Van de Velde, 2008, p. 9). This ordeal of autonomisation could actually be thought
of as an incessant personal challenge, since it has the particularity of not giving actors the possibility
to get through it totally victorious or vanquished. But approaching the question through the social
9 He was hospitalized three times over the course of a year, for periods averaging a month. His mother speaks of schizophrenia,
Antoine of depression.
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uses of the notion of autonomy allows us to take account of actors’ work in characterising this notion.
Without pursuing the quest for autonomy, which is incomplete and incompletable anyway, autonomy
remains a value constantly in play that sustains representations and practices in particular situations.
Its shared deﬁnition puts some meaning into the action, but it could just as well be the subject of
controversy and conﬂict. Each actor projects his or her own  tensions onto it, like the redeﬁnition of
dependency relationships for a young person and his or her parents, the meaning of a professional
practice, or the power of a policy orientation or institutional rule. In that, it is never a goal in itself, a
personal or collective quest; its name simply has the capacity to absorb and hold a collection of values
in a given context of representations and practices.
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